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Abstract This article deals with macro-comparative law by making use of the metaphor of 
‘reloading’. Legal family, culture and tradition are regarded as key parts of the conceptual 
software of comparative law. The metaphor of reloading is used as a device for seeing macro-
comparative law in terms of starting afresh without rejecting the old notions. The article 
shows that, despite differences, these macro-constructs overlap each other even though their 
methodologies and disciplinary frameworks differ. Hong Kong law, Dutch legal culture and 
Hindu legal traditions are used as illustrations. It is argued that the key macro-notions can be 
used simultaneously, and that there is no black-or-white logic requiring only one 
conceptualization. In short, what needs to be removed is the taxonomical objective of 
twentieth century comparative law. This means embracing the paradoxicality of the world of 
law today and accepting commensurable overlapping conceptualizations.    




Through the comparative study of law and legal systems, their intellect and imagination, we 
have developed epistemic tools to understand the nature of law – from individual rule to 
global scale – as we study modes of legal thinking in different societies and human 
communities encompassing legal language, myth, legal history and legal philosophy. This 
endeavor has not only taught us many things about law, but also about the nature of our 
attempt to understand law on a global scale. It turns out that some of our conceptual tools are, 
if you like, evergreen in their nature. In the field of comparative law, one evergreen tool has 
been legal family i.e. it refuses to disappear, or is morphed into something at least seemingly 
different. Even today ‘many, if not, most, comparative law books and treatises continue to be 
organized around this framework’.1 There seems to be no way of escaping the overarching 
epistemic grip over comparative law theory of the legal families approach. 
 
                                               
1 Mariana Pargendler, ‘The Rise and Decline of Legal Families’ (2012) 60 AJCL 1043, 1043 
 
 
This article deals with the theory of comparative law by making use of the metaphor of 
reloading, which is derived from the world of computers.2 What this metaphor evokes is 
rather simple. When computer programs reload they start a program over again. This 
normally happens when a program starts to act strangely. Often the reason for this strange 
behavior is that the program has a programming problem or, more importantly in this context, 
it conflicts with other software. The key idea behind reloading is that shutting down will 
restart the software and, thus, make the problem disappear. The problem may be caused by 
the program itself, or it might be that outside factors are causing the strange behavior that 
creates, in turn, a need to reboot the computer. 
 
The underlying assumption here is that today’s comparative law theory is acting strangely 
and, moreover, that this strange behavior calls for reloading the macro-comparative law’s 
theoretical program. All the same, this reinstalling does not require the creation of a new 
software but instead refers to reinstalling the malfunctioning components of the software that 
are already installed. In practice, this means that no new macro-concepts or notions are being 
constructed or proposed in this article.3 The situation at hand is rather such that, much like 
malfunctioning software, the present sub-programs of macro-comparative law (families, 
cultures, traditions) are not performing well together. For these reasons, this article seeks, in a 
sense, to overwrite incompatible parts of macro-comparative law’s theoretical program that 
are not working anymore or are not functioning together. This overwriting requires relocating 
some of the existing macro-comparative law information and replacing certain parts with new 
suitable particles; this is the case especially concerning the relations between key 
components. Importantly, today’s macro-comparative law theories (sub-programs) have more 
or less failed to function together and have thus made the comparative law theory act 
strangely i.e. in a incoherent and non-analytical manner. As a result, there is no clarity 
concerning the proper usage of macro-constructs; what to use, when to use, how to use, and 
so on.  
 
                                               
2 I will frequently use the expression ‘comparative law’ (Rechtsvergleichung, droit comparé meaning the same, 
although not literally) in this article in a very broad sense as to mean the comparative study of law. I am aware, 
nonetheless, that for some ‘comparative law’ may refer to a rather old-fashioned positivistically oriented 
approach. However, the latter meaning is not assumed here. Accordingly, notions of ‘comparative legal studies’ 
could also be used, even though this is not done in this article.  
3 It has been suggested that comparative law would be in need of a fresh start when classifying legal systems 
globally. See Esin Örücü, ‘Family Trees for Legal Systems: Towards a Contemporary Approach’ in M Van 
Hoecke (ed), Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law (Hart 2004)   
 
 
The applied metaphor relies essentially on the idea of ‘reloading’ in the sense that in general 
comparative law heuristics, we should start afresh. However, the argument in this article does 
not otherwise draw profoundly on computer related vocabulary; rather, the goal is to fuse 
different macro-approaches in a novel compatible and tapestry-like manner without claiming 
that one-size-fits-all. In essence, as defined by Kenneth Burke, metaphor is a ‘device for 
seeing something in terms of something else’.4  In this case, it is about conceptualizing 
macro-comparative law’s key notions in the term of ‘reloading’. 
 
To continue the metaphor, like the software code, incompatible groupings and classifications 
of legal systems are causing a system failure in the software.5 This failure can be seen in the 
way various competing macro-constructs of comparative law prevent us from grasping the 
totality of the world’s legal systems in a comprehensive manner. For one thing, because 
notions compete with each other, there is no coherence between theoretical macro-
comparative law programs. To function properly or even tenably would require having an 
overall theoretical framework for different conceptualizations of legal systems in the world. 
The purpose of this article is to discuss a possible solution to these problems by seeking to 
explain the relationships between various macro-constructs in a new manner. The discussion 
here omits the public/private distinction and addresses examples from both public and private 
law, although it is evident that traditional classifications were made exclusively on the basis 
of private law.6 The reloading proposal made here is important for comparative law in two 
respects. The first is that it is advantageous for comparative law to be freed from rigid 
taxonomies which imitate scientific precision poorly. The second is that comparative law’s 
theoretical and conceptual deposit should not be impoverished because the world of law is a 
very diverse sphere where one-size-fits-all methodology seldom works. Despite this, it would 
be a mistake to claim that there will not also be other attempts to reconstruct classical macro-
comparative notions. Importantly, recent scholarship in the field of constitutional law is an 
area where deconstructions oriented towards private law have been attempted.7 
                                               
4 Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (University of California Press 1969) 503 
5 This article does not deal with the factors behind legal family typologies and their changes. For a detailed 
discussion, see Pargendler (n 1) 
6 It has been pointed out by Mark Van Hoecke that comparative law understands, first and foremost, ‘legal 
system’ to mean national systems of private law. But, as Van Hoecke says, this definition has become 
increasingly difficult. See Mark Van Hoecke, ‘Do ‘Legal Systems’ Exist?’ in SP Donlan and L Heckenhorn 
Urscheler (eds), Concepts of Law: Comparative Law, Jurisprudential and Social Science Perspectives (Ashgate 
2014). 
7 See, eg, Thomas Fleiner and Cheryl Saunders, ‘Constitutions Embedded in Different Legal Systems’ in M 




The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In chapter 2 the key dimensions of 
macro-comparative law are discussed, and its key notions are highlighted as a kind of 
comparative law system software. Chapter 3 discusses the existing software by explaining the 
existing core macro-constructs, which are legal families, legal cultures and legal traditions. 
Chapter 4 contains an attempt to create a new order for macro-constructs by reinterpreting 
them in such a manner that they fit satisfactorily together. In the fourth chapter there are three 
short case studies or examples highlighting the relevant qualities of the core macro-
constructs. These illustrative example cases are Hong Kong’s law (member of common law 
legal family), the Netherlands (the Dutch legal culture), and the Hindu law (a legal tradition). 
Finally, chapter 5 discusses the conclusions of this study. 
 
 
2. Setting the Scene: Macro-Comparative Law 
 
Above, the notion of macro-comparative law has been referred to. But what, in fact, is it? In 
comparative law literature the discipline is normally divided into two main areas: micro-
comparison and macro-comparison. Micro-comparison deals with specific legal institutions 
or problems, whereas macro-comparison is interested in the legal profession, the spirit and 
style of law or the emblematic methods of thought and characteristic legal procedures of 
different legal systems.8 In essence, macro-comparative law is the study of whole systems 
and not particular legal institutions (e.g. marriage, contract and so on) or specific legal 
questions.9 Accordingly, systematization, grouping and classification, and often also 
taxonomization of the legal systems of the world lie at the heart of macro-comparative law.10 
                                               
8 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Tony Weir tr, 3rd edn, OUP 1998) 4-
5. This edition is a translation from the German original: Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung auf dem Gebiete 
des Privatrechts (1969). The original version was first published in 1969 (oddly, part 2 was published first and 
it was only then, two years later in 1971, that part 1 come out). 
9 Gilles Cuniberti, Grands systèmes de droit contemporains (3rd edn, LGDJ 2015) 21-22 
10 For an earlier discussion of the various approaches to the classification of legal families, see Åke Malmström, 
‘The System of Legal Systems: Notes on a Problem of Classification in Comparative Law’ (1969) 13 Sc St L 
127 and Helmut Heiss, ‘Hierarchische Rechtskreiseinteilung. Von der Rechtskreislehre zur Typologie der 
Rechtskulturen?’ (2001) 100 Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 396 
 
 
In this context, as well as throughout this article, the underlying notion of ‘legal system’ is 
used in the broadest possible sense of the word.11 
 
 
2.1. Macro-Comparative Law as a Part of Comparative Law 
 
Macro-comparative law has always sought to answer one fundamental question: Can the 
great number of legal systems of the world be divided into a few large entities, i.e., families, 
groups, spheres, cultures, traditions or equivalent macro-constructs?12 The idea of categories 
and ideal types probably came from historical sociology and was later turned into a method 
of law and economics (so-called legal origins scholarship). This discussion concentrates on 
comparative law literature, even though the methodological connection between historical 
sociology and macro-comparative law seems quite plausible.13 
 
Typically, macro-comparison places people, central legal actors and institutions in the 
foreground, whereas micro-comparison underlines the role of individual rules, cases and 
practices.14 In the same way, the underlying idea behind macro-comparison is that, by means 
of macro-constructs, the comparatist can organize the plural and sometimes mosaic-like 
reality of a given legal system under study into a comprehensible generalized entity (sources 
of law, use of the sources of law, interrelationship between rules, systematics, and key 
concepts and so on). The overarching idea seems to be that when the central features such as 
the use of legal sources, methods of legal argumentation, relation between religion and law 
are basically similar, they belong to the same legal family, legal culture or tradition, thus 
rendering it possible to explain and discuss foreign legal systems existing as parts of larger 
entities. For instance, we are fully aware that when we speak of Canadian common law, 
Italian civil law or Chinese socialist law, they are approximations derived from legal 
theoretical generalizations.  
 
                                               
11 Essentially, the notion of legal system is not a technical term as noted by Joseph Raz, ‘The Identity of Legal 
Systems’ (1971) Cal L Rev. 795, 795. Clearly, Raz’s understanding of legal system is different than what is 
used here, but this basic observation is an important one, and it also works here. 
12 cf Pargendler (n 1) 1043-44 
13 For further discussion, see Jaakko Husa, ‘Family Affair – Comparative Law's Never Ending Story?’ 
Annuario diritto comparato (Edizioni scientifiche italiane 2014) 25 
14 cf Thomas Lundmark, Charting the Divide between Common Law and Civil Law (OUP 2012) 18 
 
 
In spite of this, macro-comparative law is not and has not been without its difficulties, and so 
it certainly comes as no surprise that macro-comparative scholarship has been critical 
towards the attempt to construct global classification or an unblemished taxonomy of legal 
systems.15 One of the key points of criticism has been a claim according to which macro-
comparative law’s attempt to group and classify all legal systems is a fundamentally biased 
and non-neutral project of global Western governance.16 This argument is not without merit, 
as such criticism can be directed towards the comparative law discipline. Besides, the global 
legal world is not easily divided into well-defined families or other macro-constructs because 
the world of law is a world of ‘legal contaminations’.17 Our legally polluted world can be 
seen in the manner by which virtually all systems seem to have at least something in 
common.18 Yet – and no comparative lawyer would deny this – there are also significant 
differences between the various systems of law. Accordingly, despite the rise of the notion of 
global law, we are far from having a truly cosmopolitan law in a substantive sense.19 
 
If we leave the above criticism aside, we can say that macro-constructs like common law or 
civil law offer broad conceptual devices with which we can measure law and clarify the most 
central elements of legal reality outside of our own legal world and epistemic community. 
Alternatively, we can use these conceptualizations when describing our own systems to 
outsiders. Of course, macro-constructs may be useful for economic analyses of law too. 
However, this rather contested dimension is not dealt with in this article.20 Importantly, by 
means of macro-constructs, crude explanation and analysis may take place even if the content 
of a legal system is not described by means of overwhelming detailed information. As an 
ideal type, i.e. a type that has been refined by removing detailed characteristics (a huge 
amount of detailed qualitative legal data), a macro-construct as such is not to be reduced to 
                                               
15 See, eg, Jaakko Husa, ‘Classification of Legal Families Today – Is It Time for a Memorial Hymn? ‘ (2004) 
56 Revue internationale de droit comparé 11 and Mathias Siems, ‘Varieties of Legal Systems: Towards a New 
Global Taxonomy’ (2016) 12 J Inst Economics 579    
16 See Pier Giuseppe Monateri, ‘Everybody’s Talking: the Future of Comparative Law’ (1998) 21 Hastings Intl 
& Comp L R 825, 839 
17 See Pier Giuseppe Monateri, ‘The Weak Law: Contaminations and Legal Cultures’ (2003) 13 Transnational 
L & Cont Problems 579 
18 This idea is the fundamental assumption behind H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable 
Diversity in Law (4th edn, OUP 2010) 
19 For a wider discussion see, eg, Neil Walker, Intimations of Global Law (CUP 2014) 
20 See, eg, Simon Deakin and Katharina Pistor (eds), Legal Origin Theory (Elgar 2012). For a critical overview 
of the uneasy relationship between comparative law and law and economics, see Florian Wagner-Von Papp, 
‘Comparative Law & Economics and the “Egg-Laying-Wool-Milk-Sow”’ (2014) J Comp L 137 
 
 
any real, existing legal system. 21 Put simply, describing Australian or Canadian systems as 
common law systems does not suffice in order to receive a more detailed view filled with 
relevant subtleties. To sum up, the macro-construct is the culmination of the typical features 
of its empirical models; if you like, it is a kind of simplified shadow representation of the 
intricate real model.22 
 
 
2.2. Macro-Constructs as the System Software 
 
Essentially, to argue that the epistemic problem lies in the macro-comparative law’s software 
means that there is an issue with the program or data, but not a problem with the computer. 
Of course, in this context, the computer is the field of macro-comparative law which is being 
regarded here as a legitimate form of comparative law scholarship.23 But what the 
metaphorically used term ‘software’ actually means against this backdrop requires some 
clarification. Basically, macro-comparative law consists of layers which are concepts (or key 
notions) constructed by comparative law scholars. In this article they are called macro-
constructs which are formed by combining distinctive elements of groups of legal systems.24 
Simply put, these constructs form the software of macro-comparative law’s theory. 
 
Macro-comparative law’s theory and the constructs are the interface between individual legal 
systems (hardware) and user applications, i.e. what comparatists actually do. From there it 
follows that academic legal texts rely on the legal-theoretical language, which is largely the 
language of macro-comparative law: We speak of common law, civil law, indigenous law, 
Islamic law and so on. Now, this kind of macro-comparative law consists of several parts that 
are incompatible today, i.e. incapable of harmonious coexistence or of being used together 
because they are paradigmatically intended to exclude each other. However, before we can 
proceed to reorganizing the current macro-constructs, we need to discuss and briefly explain 
                                               
21 See Jaakko Husa, A New Introduction to Comparative Law (Hart 2015) 221-222 
22 See for a more detailed discussion on the shadow argument, Jaakko Husa, ‘The Future of Legal Families’ in 
Oxford Handbooks Online – Law (2016), DOI 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935352.013.26. 
23 However, there are some views that doubt the legitimacy of comparative law as a field, David Kennedy, ‘The 
Method and the Politics of Comparative Law’ in P Legrand & R Munday (eds), Comparative Legal Studies: 
Traditions and Transitions (CUP 2003) 
24 These may be called also by other names. For example, in his article Mattei called them ‘patterns of law’. 
Ugo Mattei, ‘Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal Systems’ (1997) 45 AJCL 5 
 
 
what the key components of the present software are. Importantly, we do not need to 
maintain that macro-comparative law’s taxonomies and classifications would be an important 
scientific question.25 It suffices here to recognize and discuss the key components of the 
macro-constructs from the point of view of reloading the theoretical program of macro-
comparative law. Accordingly, the following discussion is not meant to be exhaustive. 
Instead, it seeks to point out the main features and related issues. 
 
 
3. Installed Software – the Major Macro-Constructs 
 
Arguing in the previous section that macro-constructs are a kind of a software for macro-
comparative law may lead to other questions. One relevant question is as follows: how can 
we use a vocabulary originated in the world of computers in macro-comparative law? But in 
fact, the chosen metaphor is not as disingenuous as one might assume because macro-
constructs of comparative law, broadly speaking, have similar underlying features: while they 
are not exact empirical descriptions of a group of legal systems, they are conceptual devices 
that provide an overall view of law over the globe and a rough first-step outline for more 
detailed comparative studies. As such, all macro-constructs contain both empirical and 
analytical features. In short, macro-constructs are broad epistemic matrixes of macro-
comparative law. Generally speaking, macro-constructs may facilitate the study of foreign 
law and provide a sweeping overall view of a system for a student or an outside lawyer who 
cannot grasp the substantive contents of a foreign system to any large degree.26 In what 
follows, the macro-constructs of family, culture and tradition are explained as parts of the 





In the world of macro-comparative law there are two paradigmatic legal family groupings 
that have been particularly central to the software of macro-comparative law. Their scholarly 
impact has been multiplied by numerous editions and translations into other languages over 
                                               
25 See Vernon Valentine Palmer, ‘Quebec and Her Sisters in the Third Legal Family’ (2009) 54 McGill L J 323, 
335 
26 See Jaakko Husa, ‘Legal Families in Comparative Law - Are They of Any Real Use?’ (2001) 24 Retfærd 15 
 
 
the years. These are the renowned groupings by René David (1906–1990), and by Konrad 
Zweigert (1911–1996) and Hein Kötz (1935–), which are situated at the very heart of what we 
can call mainstream comparative law. 
 
David is famous for his influential Grands Systémes approach, which was mainly built upon 
the epistemic foundation of the private law of the Western nation-states.27 He distinguished 
four great legal families: Roman-German, common law, Socialist law, and philosophical or 
religious systems. In the last group he included Muslim law, Hindu law, law of the Far East 
and the law of Africa and Madagascar. However, David’s last group was not actually a legal 
family because the systems allocated in it were quite independent of each other; this is in 
contrast to the systems within the other genuine legal families with historical relations or 
actual points of contact. David gave great significance to Socialist law, today drastically 
diminished. This is because, in his thinking, comparative law acted as a tool for finding 
certain common ground between the enemies of the Cold War; he wanted to find 
commonality in the area of law of the socialist states and Western states.28 The taxonomy and 
approach of Grands Systémes was long accepted by many as being plausible; in the 
Francophone world especially, this scholarly tradition seems to have a relatively strong 
position even today.29 
 
After David, the place of orthodoxy in macro-comparative law has, at least outside the 
Francophone world, been occupied by the influential and widely spread system of legal 
families by Zweigert and Kötz.30 They distinguished these legal families after the collapse of 
the socialist, Romanist, Germanic, Nordic and common law families. Besides these, they also 
recognized the law of the People’s Republic of China, Japanese law, Islamic law and Hindu 
law. Their basic starting point was to commence from a group of criteria and not to lean on 
any single criterion. Their most important criterion was that of style: the comparatist must 
grasp the legal style of a system and use its distinctive features as a basis for classifying legal 
                                               
27 Originally published in 1964, today the book is already in its 12th edition. René David, Camille Jauffret-
Spinosi, Marie Goré, Les grands systèmes de droit contemporains (12th edn, Dalloz 2016) 
28 For a more detailed discussion, see Jorge Esquirol, René David: at the Head of the Legal Family’ in A Riles 
(ed), Rethinking the Masters of Comparative Law (Hart 2001) 
29 See Cuniberti (n 9) and Raymond Legeais, Grands systèmes de droit contemporains – Approche comparative 
(3nd edn, LexisNexis 2016) 
30 See Zweigert & Kötz (n 8) part I B 
 
 
systems into groups. As with their immediate predecessors, the classification was made 
especially from the point of view of private law.31  
 
Within the style of a legal system there were multiple individual factors to be taken into 
account. These were the historical development, distinctive mode of legal thinking, 
characteristic legal institutions, sources of law and ideology. In this sense Zweigert and 
Kötz’s taxonomy was a combination of many of the features of earlier classifications. Their 
most important novelty was, as soon as from the early German editions, the division between 
Roman and German law. Furthermore, Zweigert and Kötz even recognized the problem with 
hybrid systems, which are difficult to place within any single family or group of law. Along 
similar lines to David, they also said that their grouping served the function of introducing 
the great legal systems of the world. In short, Zweigert and Kötz’s method by and large co-
insides with David’s Grands Systémes approach in a methodological and epistemological 
sense: formal legal rules and institutions, as well as the historical paths of the Western 
official law, played a dominant role. 
 
Today, in addition to the legal families of civil law and common law, a third legal family of 
mixed legal systems can also be discerned. It has been argued that mixed legal systems, such 
as Scotland, Quebec, Israel and South Africa, are a separate legal family with common 
characteristics alongside civil law and common law systems.32 Mixed legal systems typically 
simultaneously contain key characteristics of other legal families, albeit with different routes 
towards the hybridity of the legal system. According to Palmer, the third legal family is 
‘conceived for purposes of convenience, utility, and explanatory power’, and it can be used 
‘only if it provides better insights than comparative analysis has provided in the past’.33 As 
with the approaches of the other legal families, the third legal family approach also gives 
great weight to written law and the pedigree of official legal institutions by disregarding the 
contexts of law. This brings us to the next section, where we discuss legal cultures. 
 
 
                                               
31 See Jaakko Husa, ‘Legal Families’ in JM Smits (ed), Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (2nd edn, 
Elgar 2012) 
32 See Vernon V Palmer (ed), Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide: the Third Legal Family (2nd edn, CUP 2012) 





The notion of legal culture is a relatively recent newcomer to the world of comparative law. 
If one reads older literature there is rather scarce use of this concept; perhaps only a passing 
mention here and there.34 When Ehrmann’s book, using the very concept of ‘legal culture’ in 
the context of comparative study of law, was published in 1976 the use of the concept was 
still in its infancy compared to today.35 But, taking stock of today’s scholarship, the situation 
is evidently different. There is a repeated use of this concept, which is entertained, normally, 
to denote the versatile, purely non-legal embedding of law: history, language, society, 
politics, and so on. Moreover, this notion is used by many scholars – not only comparatists – 
and for many purposes. For the present purpose, the focus is on comparative law theory, 
where legal culture is used as an alternative macro-level conceptualization or substitute for 
legal family. 
 
Obviously the notion of culture differs from the notion of family as a macro-construct 
describing a group of legal systems. But where did it come from? We may, perhaps, trace the 
growth of legal culture back to the influential writings of Friedmann, whose contribution has 
been understood to refer to the external attitudes, ideas and expectations concerning law, i.e. 
especially to those who are not looking at law from inside, or doctrinally, as jurists do.36 
From this angle the mainspring in using legal culture is that it seems to contain a 
methodological promise to comparative law, i.e. it surpasses the doctrinal and narrowly 
historical view dominating the legal family approach.37 This is an important point because by 
using such an open concept as legal culture (as opposed to the narrower ‘legal system’, which 
reflects positivism) there would be a possibility to transform comparative law to become 
more sociologically meaningful by bringing in ‘larger frameworks of social structure and 
                                               
34 For example, Kamba spoke of intra-cultural and cross-cultural comparisons and referred to ‘different cultural 
and socio-economic backgrounds’ (eg English, French, African) and quoted earlier literature that mentioned 
also ‘the cultural background’. WJ Kamba, ‘Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework’ (1974) 23 ICLQ 485. 
Of course, however, such a handy concept has been in the background or otherwise present in the writings of 
earlier comparative law authorities. See also Jacques Vanderlinden, Comparer les droits (Kluwer 1995) 326-327 
35 Henry Walter Ehrmann, Comparative Legal Cultures (Prentice-Hall 1976) 
36 Roger Cotterell, ‘Comparatists and Sociology’ in (n 23) 
37 Örücü describes the intellectual climate in which this promise is received by saying that: ‘We as comparative 
lawyers see the need for such understanding and yet require the help of others such as economists, political 
scientists, sociologists and psychologists in order to grasp true meanings, even when we are looking at our own 
legal system.’ Esin Örücü, The Enigma of Comparative Law: Variations on a Theme for the Twenty-First 
Century (Martinus Nijhoff 2004) 45 
 
 
culture’, which would, in turn, ‘reveal the place of law in society’.38 However, it remains a 
fact that as a large, or even almost all encompassing concept, legal culture is awkward to 
place in a genuinely global definition.39 
 
In any case, in literature there are some basic observations that can be easily made 
concerning some of the most characteristic uses of the concept. One typical category of use is 
to deploy it in order to explain something. For example, we may claim that there is something 
called Japanese legal culture while we seek to explain or to understand certain features of 
Japanese law in a very broad and general sense. Often by saying this we use very general 
factors, such as mentality or social philosophy, which are offered as a way to explain relevant 
macro-level findings of comparative research. For example, in the case of Japanese law there 
has been a tendency to say that it culturally emphasizes Confucian social tradition, which is 
by its fundamental nature harmony seeking and conflict avoiding. By saying this we normally 
explain the low number of lawyers and low number of civil litigation rates.40 Along similar 
lines we have become accustomed to refering to, say, Chinese legal culture (as a certain kind 
of legal fiction) in a manner that is labelled fittingly – with critical flavor – as ‘legal 
orientalism’.41 By using the concept of legal culture in this manner, we wish to escape from 
the mere ‘law in books’ and hope to place law in a larger socio-cultural context. This 
epistemic move is reasonable and, in the light of the pedigree of comparative law, also 
somewhat justified – if you follow those who stress legal culture, you are very likely going to 
give a different answer to the question ‘what to compare’ than those who would like to 
concentrate on ‘law in books’.42  
 
This usage of legal culture is characteristically restricted to a certain system or to a certain 
geographical area. In essence, it is a macro-construct patched up by comparative legal 
scholars who do not wish – or deem it otherwise problematic – to use legal families 
belonging to more traditional comparative law. In the former meaning we may speak of 
                                               
38 David Nelken, ‘Legal Culture’ in (n 23) 375 
39 See Werner Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa (2nd edn, 
CUP 2006) 173-190. And as critics have pointed out it may have ‘just too many meanings for it to be a 
serviceable concept to use to explain differences in socio-legal attitudes and behaviour’, David Nelken, ‘Legal 
Cultures’ in DS Clark (ed), Comparative Law and Society (Elgar 2012) 
40 See, eg, John O Haley, The Spirit of Japanese Law (University of Georgia Press1998) 
41 On this concept see Teemu Ruskola, ‘Legal Orientalism’ (2002) 101 Mich L Rev 179 
42 See Örücü (n 37) 41-50  
 
 
Italian legal culture, Finnish legal culture, or Hungarian legal culture, and so on.43 In the 
latter meaning we may even coin large areas as belonging to some vaguely studied and 
perhaps even more vaguely understood legal culture as a sort of a macro-size legal fiction, 
such as South-East Asia or Africa. In comparison to the legal families approach, the cultural 
approach is more contextual in its nature; it broadens its scope beyond and outside the official 
law and doctrine, but does not inevitably look into the more philosophical and broadly 
understood epistemic-anthropological issues. In essence, legal culture is a socio-legal 






Comparative law circles became more familiar with this concept probably due to J.H. 
Merryman’s famous book The Civil Law Tradition.44 Anyone reading that book, or its later 
editions, will grasp that Merryman’s way of defining legal tradition is close to those 
definitions and uses that are sociological or relate closest to socio-legal studies. Notable 
comparatist H. Patrick Glenn (1940–2014) sought to define, understand and use it differently 
from Merryman.  Glenn’s approach represents modern macro-comparison in which the 
orientation is theoretical and has a modern anthropological and legal-pluralism friendly 
touch. For Glenn, the most significant legal traditions in the world were the following: the 
Jewish, civil law, Islamic, common law, Hindu and the Far East legal traditions, and the oral 
traditions of the indigenous peoples (chtonic legal traditions). Glenn not only dealt with each 
tradition in its separate box, but also placed them in a parallel position to one other, thus 
exposing the interaction (present and past) between different traditions. The interaction 
between traditions is outlined through lengthy processes, not so much by means of individual 
cases of foreign law adoption or reception. Yet, our view of law and tradition has been 
                                               
43 Eg, Erhard Blankenburg & Freeks Bruinsma, Dutch Legal Culture (2nd edn, Kluwer 1994). This may 
sometimes, in its sophisticated form, take a plural outlook as in John Bell, French Legal Cultures (Butterworths 
2002)  
44 JH Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin 
America (Stanford University Press 1969). Later the concept was used in the famous book Mary Ann Glendon, 
Michael Wallace Gordon and Christopher Osakwe, Comparative Legal Traditions: Texts Materials and Cases 
in the Civil Law, Common Law and Socialist Law Traditions with Special Reference to French, West German, 
English and Soviet Law (West Group 1985). Both of these books have had numerous later editions. 
 
 
problematic because Westerners do not want to see ourselves as traditional societies because 
we are accustomed to contrasting tradition with progressive and independent thinking.45 
Glenn, however, saw a fundamental problem with this. The core-feature of our legal mind has 
its historical roots in the European past because we were forced to destroy the governance of 
traditional society in order to overcome the inequalities of the past.46 But what actually is 
‘tradition’? According to Glenn, ‘tradition emerges as a loose conglomeration of data, 
organized around a basic theme or themes, and variously described as a “bundle”, a 
“toolbox”, a “language”, a “playground”, a “seedbed”, a “ragbag” or a “bran-tub.”’47  
 
So, tradition is a kind of transmitted information and, accordingly, legal tradition is 
transmitted information concerning what is law, where we acquire knowledge of it from and 
the kind of approaches we should use while seeking valid information about law. Legal 
tradition conceived in this manner is of a positive nature. Accordingly, there are not many 
sane people who would seriously defend a tradition of corruption, even though it may be an 
extremely firmly rooted legal tradition of a given country or a society.48 The same is true for 
many other examples (Mafia, female genital mutilation, so-called honor killings, and so on).  
 
In Glenn’s view, when dealing with the question of relations between legal traditions, the 
question of identity surfaces. Concerns about identity arise primarily in situations in which 
there are external contacts, and it is this interaction by which identities are constructed – the 
‘Other’ legal tradition is, in this sense, essential for the process of self-understanding. Simply 
put, denying the (legal or law-related) value of another tradition makes our own more vibrant. 
However, this picture is partially false since traditions are not autonomic, but have something 
in common with other traditions. In this view, things such as color (or ethnicity), state (or 
                                               
45 While listing Rechtskreis’es Hein Kötz speaks of common law, civil law and so on, but when he mentions 
Chinese and Japanese law he refers to der konfuzianischen Tradition. Hein Kötz, ’Abschied von der 
Rechtskreislehre?’ (1998) 6 Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 493, 494 . Grossfeld hits the mark when 
referring to Islamic, Mosaic, Hindu and Canon law and the modern Western legal understanding of itself: ‘We 
do not see our own law as falling in any such category’. Grossfeld, The Strength and Weakness of Comparative 
Law (Clarendon 1990) 107 
46 ‘For centuries in western thought, tradition has been associated with static forms of social order’. Patrick 
Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World (2nd edn, OUP 2004) 23 
47 Glenn (n 46) 15  
48 Tradition also ‘bears within the seeds of corruption, the various forms of human frailty which would convert 
it to an instrument of perverse and personal ends. All this is the world within, the risks and perils in the internal 
life of a tradition. There is also the world beyond, the world of other traditions and of the relations between 
traditions. It too presents its perils’. Glenn (n 46) 29. Menski has the view that often ‘tradition’ is held to belong 
in the same category as ‘religion’ Menski (n 39) 31 
 
 
nationality) or geography do not form a proper basis for historically conditioned information 
of law’s ontology, epistemology and methodology. Moreover, there are no pure social 
identities either: ‘Each is constituted by tradition and all traditions contain elements of the 
others’.49 In this sense, Western legal tradition contains something from the Eastern, and they 
share common elements and even common themes of discussion, as did Socialist law and 
Western bourgeoisie law. 
 
It looks as if Western rationality and individualism have received a major boost from the 
present situation since they are able to influence other traditions or, alternatively, other 
traditions have been forced to put more effort into using persuasion to defend their traditions.  
In all Western states, the formal law encounters the religious-based rules of Islam, which may 
play ‘an important role in the lives of islamic people living in the west, whether or not it is 
recognized by the state.’50 According to the argument backing the incommensurability of 
traditions, we, the Westerners, are basically saying that because our legal systems are so 
different from other legal traditions, we cannot learn from them – traditions are, in all ways, 
incommensurable. But this untranslatability thesis is not valid because it is denied by human 
experience. Glenn explained that: ‘Knowing only one’s tradition is partly knowing others’.51 
In a sense, the very idea is to consult different legal traditions and, by doing so, attempt to 
identify comparative learning possibilities.52 This idea is, of course, rooted in the thinking 
according to which law and general culture/tradition are not separated from each other such 





4. Reorganizing the Existing Software  
 
                                               
49 Glenn (n 46) 38 
50 ibid 215 
51 ibid 46. The argument here is not as odd as it may appear at first glance. Basically, it has theoretical grounds 
in hermeneutical philosophy. Gadamer also recognized the same phenomenon: ‘To be situated within a tradition 
does not limit the freedom of knowledge but makes it possible’. Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (2nd 
edn, Continuum 1994) 361. In this sort of thinking the idea rests upon hermeneutical experience which in turn 
‘is concerned with tradition’, ibid 358.  
52 Also Watson’s theory of legal transplants recognizes this interaction and, thus, comparative learning. Alan 
Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (2nd edn, University of Georgia Press 1993) 6-7. 
(This edition contains an afterword, not present in the first edition of 1974, in which Watson comments on some 
of the criticism, and updates his thinking concerning legal borrowing and change). 
 
 
Basically, the macro-constructs dealt with above all perform tolerably in their restricted areas 
and for certain purposes. However – and here is the thing – issues arise. To simplify a great 
deal: positive law for doctrinalists, contexts of law for socio-legal scholars and epistemic-
anthropological dimensions for those seeking to understand how law adapts to its cultural 
environments under long periods of time. The argument here is not to claim that macro-
constructs would fail for their intended specific purposes. Nevertheless, the problem is that 
they do not work together, i.e. they are incompatible and often openly hostile towards each 
other. If macro-comparative law’s theoretical program is reloaded, then, it is not an 
unsurmountable obstacle if parts of the software work in different areas and for different 
purposes, provided that the macro-constructs do not harmfully overlap and cause 
malfunctions because of the actively colliding components. Yet, these macro-constructs form 
macro-comparative law’s conceptual system or a group of related components that ought to 
fit together, at least to an extent, if we are to avoid an openly conflictual theoretical disarray.  
 
Crucially, the disciplinary pattern is clear: chronologically later macro-constructs claim to be 
better, at least in some key respects, in comparison to other competing macro-constructs. In 
other words, they are explicitly or implicitly built on an assumption that other macro-
constructs perform poorer in their attempt to depict the global world of law and differing 
legal systems. Consequently, it is argued here that the existing collection of macro-construct 
components is possible to organize – reload – in such a manner that parts are arranged to 
serve a common purpose of global classification of legal systems without inevitable 
collisions with each other. This is not as paradoxical a feat as it may appear at first appear, 
but it requires reinterpretation and a certain distance from the rhetorical conceit of 
mainstream comparative law scholarship. Or, in other words, we can have our cake and eat it. 
 
 
4.1. Family – Underlining Doctrine and Positivistic Legal History 
 
The previous section pointed out that what separates the notion of legal family from other 
macro-constructs is the fact that it is built on an overarching and underlying idea of family 
relations between certain legal systems. If one reads comparative law literature, one detects 
that the vocabulary and style of writing on legal families tends to be stylistically doctrinal and 
focuses on official law and legal sources. In essence, legal family contains an idea of direct 
historical family relations between legal systems. That is one of the reasons why legal family 
 
 
approaches are strong with common law, civil law and Islamic law but struggle to cope with 
things like Hindu law, Asian law or indigenous law. The notion of legal family underlines the 
legal ancestry of official law and its lineage, unlike the notions of legal culture and legal 
tradition.  
 
Basically, legal systems are perceived as official law relatives that are connected to a certain 
family through inheritance or by forced marriage (i.e. colonialism). The legal family 
approach is a historically determined and doctrinally oriented macro-comparison holding that 
there are relevant actual past interrelations between systems. The idea of a family means that 
a group of legal systems are related by legal historical contacts: we can have parenting 
systems like English law for common law systems, children and cousins like Nordic law for 
civil law, and so on.53 The point is that interaction or other kinds of contact has once existed 
in the real world (i.e. as a blood relation in a biological family), as opposed to being merely 
part of a theoretical narrative based on certain commonalities. Quintessentially, this 
conceptualization – if we exclude the analytically constructed ‘third’ legal family – contains 
an idea of genealogical relations based on ancestry, descent, or other relationships (through 
transplanting or reception) of all members of the family tree (common law, civil law, Islamic 
law, and so on).54 Importantly, though, this does not necessarily mean that legal family 
approaches would actually take legal history into account very deeply. Hence, legal historical 
relations are the foundational epistemological assumption rather than an actual scholarly 
tendency to do actual research in legal history, i.e. legal historical contacts are something that 
are taken for granted because of the genealogy of formal rules, cases, doctrines and legal 
institutions. There are many examples, but here we will  discuss the legal system of Hong 
Kong briefly as an example of family relations, i.e. law’s blood relations or kin. What is 




4.1.1. Illustration of Legal Family: Hong Kong’s Common Law 
                                               
53 Some have underlined the role of history for the comparative study of law. Watson, in particular, has argued 
that ‘in the first place, Comparative Law is Legal History concerned with the relationship between systems’. 
Watson (n 52) 6 
54 Descent and kinship as elemental parts of legal families, see also Erhard Blankenburg, ‘Patterns of Legal 




Legal systems normally tend to represent only one predominant (internal) legal pattern, 
although there are many examples of systems following more complicated structures.55 This 
is also one key reason why we can patch macro-constructs with some level of internal 
coherence. In spite of this, in Canada, for instance, the French speaking Province of Quebec 
clearly differs from the rest of Canada because it follows French civil law, whereas the 
English speaking parts of the country follow the model of English common law.56 Hong 
Kong also follows a similar type of dualistic system but, of course, the historical reasons for 
this state of affairs are different from those of Canada, although there are also certain 
similarities related to the colonial heritage.57 However, whereas in Canada both legal systems 
are Western, in Hong Kong the two simultaneously existing legal patterns are distinctly 
different from one another. Whereas Hong Kong places its trust in the independent common 
law judiciary and the written Basic Law, mainland China may view the judicial application of 
even its own Constitution ‘as potentially threatening to the party leadership’.58 Accordingly, 
Hong Kong follows two kinds of legal cultural patterns even though it belongs – for now at 
least – to the common law legal family. Similar examples could also be South Africa, which 
offers a fascinating example of many legal families; common law, Dutch Roman law, and the 
re-emergence of old customary traditions.59 
 
Hong Kong has a distinct and unique legal and constitutional history that explains many of 
the mixed features of its present system of government and law. However, it would be a 
mistake to regard its special features as a recent occurrence because, ‘Hong Kong, from the 
beginning was fated to be anomalous’ concerning the way it was to be governed.60 And, from 
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 See Palmer (n 32) 6  
56  In the case of Canada, the term ‘bijuralism’ is referred to. It’s a notion that has emerged as a descriptive term 
for the situation in which two legal traditions exist within a single State. Accordingly, Canada is regarded as a 
bijural country because the civil law and the common law coexist legally and in official languages. See, eg, 
Louise Maguire Wellington, Bijuralism in Canada: Harmonization Methodology and Terminology (Department 
of Justice Canada 2000) http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/harmonization/hfl-hlf/b4-f4/bf4.pdf. See also 
Michael McAuley, ‘Quebec’ in (n 32) 
57 For common law originated in the British Empire and its relation to nation-States, see Glenn (n 18) 262-69 
(‘embedding of common law thinking in a large number of diverse societies around the world’, 262). 
58 Qianfan Zhang, ‘A Constitution without Constitutionalism? The Paths of Constitutional Developments in 
China’ (2010) 8 Intl J Const L 950, 962 
59 Moreover, South Africa can be compared to Scottish law, with similar legal cultural transformations, without 
customary law though. See Cornie van der Merwe, ‘The Origin and Characteristics of the Mixed Legal Systems 
of South Africa and Scotland and Their Importance in Globalisation’ (2012) 18 Fundamina  91 
60 Frank Welsh, A History of Hong Kong (Harper Collins 1997) 147 
 
 
the beginning, there were two sets of legal conventions seeking to govern the colony: English 
law and Chinese law.61 Against this backdrop, Hong Kong’s law has had a mixed legal 
culture since the 1840s. In essence 1997, the year of the Handover, did not lead to a drastic 
change in the mixed nature of the law of Hong Kong. But, of course, the ingredients of the 
legal mixture changed dramatically. However, ‘In Hong Kong, the common law system is 
still in place’.62 The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) has enjoyed 
significant autonomous self-rule, with human rights and civil liberties provided by the Basic 
Law and enforced by a common law style judicial system.63 In the sense of legal families, 
Hong Kong’s law belongs to the common law because of its legal ancestry, official law and 
internal legal culture.64 
 
As is typical for the legal families approach, the historical path of official law is of 
importance and Hong Kong is no exception to that. First, Hong Kong was a British Crown 
Colony for more than 150 years after China ceded Hong Kong Island to Britain in 1842. 
Moreover, in 1898 China leased the area north of Kowloon to the British for 99 years. In 
1982, talks began between China and the UK concerning the future of Hong Kong. These 
negotiations led to the signing of the Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong by the 
respective Governments in 1984, which affirmed Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong from 
1997.65 In 1985, the Hong Kong Act provided for the ending of British sovereignty and 
jurisdiction over Hong Kong for good. From 1997, Hong Kong has been a Special 
Administrative Region of the PRC.66 The most important legal document of a constitutional 
nature is the Basic Law of Hong Kong.67  
 
                                               
61 Welsh (n 60) 138 
62 Junwei Fu, ‘China’ in (n 31) 137.  
63 From a comparative law point of view, see Guobin Zhu, ‘A Tale of Two Legal Systems: The Interaction of 
Common Law and Civil Law in Hong Kong’ (1999) 51 Revue internationale de droit comparé 917  
64 Internal legal culture is typically related to the ideas, behavior and practices of legal professionals. See David 
Nelken, ‘Using the Concept of Legal Culture’ (2004) 29 Australian J L Phil 1, 8-9 
65 About the background, see Yash Ghai, Hong Kong’s New Constitutional Order: The Resumption of Chinese 
Sovereignty and the Basic Law (2nd edn, HKU Press 1999) 1-33. See also Welsh (n 60) 502-35. 
66 The official name is Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, in 
Chinese: 中華人民共和國香港特別行政區 (Jyutping Romanization: zung1waa4 jan4 man4 gung6 wo4 gwok3 
hoeng1 gong2 dak6 bit6 hang4 zing3 keoi1 zing3 fu2).  
67 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China. 
(Adopted at the Third Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress on 4 April 1990, promulgated by 
Order No. 26 of the President of the People's Republic of China on 4 April 1990, effective as of 1 July 1997). 
 
 
The first Article in the Basic Law defines HKSAR as ‘an inalienable part of the People’s 
Republic of China’. Even though the exact nature of the Hong Kong Basic Law is all but 
clear, it is undoubtedly an exceptionally important legal document that has a constitutional 
nature.68 Notwithstanding, from mainland China’s perspective the HKSAR Basic Law does 
not hold status as a constitutional document and, in fact, there are more than 60 such ‘basic 
laws’ in force in the PRC.69 In the macro-comparative view, Basic Law demonstrates how 
two kinds of legal cultural heritages can be knitted together within one legal family: Basic 
Law is a hinge between the Chinese socialist version of civil law and Hong Kong’s common 
law legal culture and heritage. 
 
In a macro-comparative perspective, Hong Kong’s past and present is reflected in its legal 
system, which can be characterized as mixed law. However, in most aspects it is more 
common law than mixed. By and large, Hong Kong follows the English common law model, 
but it must also observe – to an extent – the civil socialist legal system of the PRC.70 This 
mixture system made up of statute laws is known as the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ 
doctrine. This also means that Hong Kong maintains a capitalistic economic system within 
the People’s Republic of China, which follows quite a different economic system and internal 
legal culture.71 The Basic Law contains many provisions securing the role of common law in 
the HKSAR. For instance, Art. 84 provides that the HKSAR courts ‘may refer to precedents 
of other common law jurisdictions’. Generally, this model ‘envisages the co-existence of two 
distinct legal systems alongside one another’.72 But, these links also cause inconveniences 
because forging common law and socialist civil law together is not an easy feat. No surprise, 
then, that at first the common lawyers of Hong Kong clearly overlooked the coexistence of 
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 About the nature of the Hong Kong Basic Law, see Danny Gittings, Introduction to the Hong Kong Basic 
Law (2nd edn, HKU Press 2016) 36-54 
69 Gittings (n 68) 42 (refers to Michael Dowle). 
70 Art. 8 of Basic Law provides that, ‘The laws previously in force in Hong Kong, that is, the common law, 
rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law shall be maintained, except for any that 
contravene this Law, and subject to any amendment by the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region.’ 
71 According to the Basic Law’s Art. 5, ‘The socialist system and policies shall not be practised in the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region, and the previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged 
for 50 years.’ 
72 Johannes Chan, ‘Basic Law and Constitutional Review: The First Decade’ (2007) 37 Hong Kong L J 407, 
407. Chan continues: ‘On one side of the border, there is a well-established common law system that is based on 
Western liberalism and the doctrine of separation of powers…On the other side of the border…Chinese legal 
system is based on both the socialist system and the civil law system, but it is subject to increasing influence 
from the common law system in recent years.’ ibid 407-8. 
 
 
‘the very different system that applies in the rest of China, where interpretation is not 
necessarily linked to deciding court cases’.73 It is hardly a surprise that there are pressures 
mounting in China against the internal common law legal culture of Hong Kong legal 
professionals.74 The relationship between the common law and mainland version of civil law 
models can be characterized as tense.75 Tensions become highly visible, mounting to a legal 
clash, whenever the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of China issues 
an authoritative interpretation on Hong Kong’s Basic Law. 
 
Crucially, from the point of view of this article, Hong Kong’s legal system is classified as 
belonging to the common law legal family. Hong Kong adopted common law not because it 
was a virtuous foreign law, but because it was part of the colonial governance of the United 
Kingdom. In this particular sense Hong Kong really is a member of the common law family, 
yet its external legal culture is no longer purely of a common law nature. Nevertheless, its 
legal language, legal education and legal literature are English, which demonstrates how 
strongly Hong Kong still belongs doctrinally and historically to the common law legal 
family. However, from the point of view of legal culture, taking into account the effect of 





4.2. Culture – Underlining Socio-Legal Dimensions 
 
Even though legal culture is primarily a socio-legal construction, it may be useful to make the 
point that not all the uses or definitions of legal culture stem from a socio-legal framework. 
Instead, they transcend the limits of legal families’ legal positivism so that law’s internal 
                                               
73 Gittings (n 68) 220 
74 There are lots of examples where foreign judges have been subjected to criticism for allegedly not protecting 
the public interest against individual interest. For instance, in March 2017 the jailing of seven police officers 
who beat up a protester led to harsh criticism and even downright anger at the British judge who passed 
sentence, thus reopening the debate about the number of expats in the Hong Kong judicial system. See Eddie 
Lee, ‘Beijing throws the book at Hong Kong’s foreign judges’ South China Morning Post, March 10, 2017, 
available at http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-crime/article/2077521/experts-line-throw-book-hong-
kongs-foreign-judges. 
75 Jaakko Husa,’’Accurately, Completely, and Solemnly’ – One Country, Two Systems and an Uneven 
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description of itself is replaced by an external description of law. Here we find different 
socio-historical, sociological, cultural and historical frameworks.76 Accordingly, legal culture 
may be defined so that it contains elements from multiple fields that study law – not just 
doctrinal studies, but sociology, philosophy and history.77 This almost all encompassing 
understanding of legal culture is broad, and it seems to contain the necessary elements that 
we need in order to escape from an approach that would rather conceive law in doctrinal 
isolation.78  
 
Nevertheless, this definition seems to refer primarily to the legal-sociological understanding 
of the concept; it does not just refer to the manner reminiscent of legal theory, namely when 
the professional (internal) dimension of law is characterized. In a very broad view legal 
culture is conceived of as kind of a sum or a bundle of historical, empirical and psychological 
factors that include law’s development, its application, the interests and qualities of 
professional legal actors, and even the general consciousness of the public.79 But there seems 
to be more to it. The macro-construct of legal culture seeks to be more than just a faithful 
empirical description of legally relevant patterns of social behavior and attitudes towards law 
within a society.80 In any case, it exceeds the doctrinal and narrowly historical gaze of the 
legal families approach. 
 
In essence, legal culture is integrally a methodological framework that plays a certain role 
within the general methodology of the comparative study of law. Accordingly, we may 
                                               
76 Csaba Varga, ‘Legal Traditions? In Search for Families and Cultures of Law’ (2005) 4 Acta Juridica 
Hungarica 177 (Varga, however, actually distinguishes two ways to understand ‘legal culture’. The first is in a 
sociological way, while the second is in a cultural anthropological way in which legal culture is seen as a 
‘general mode of thinking’ which contains an ‘underlying world-view’.) 
77 Varga (n 76) 182. Varga’s conception contains various elements: ‘Legal cultures include ethos, values, 
conceptual and referential frame related to law, judicial skills and habits, as well as ideology and deontology of 
legal profession, among others. It is component that gives law a life, makes it dependent from local histories and 
domestic culture define its orientation, shapes its receptiveness, and, in case of eventual reform, backs or 
withstands to it’. Csaba Varga, Transition to Rule of Law: On the Democratic Transformation in Hungary 
(Philosophiae Iuris 1995) 85 
78 Obviously one might feel tempted to argue that this definition is poorly analytical. The weakness of this 
counter-argument can nevertheless be met by denoting the pluralistic nature of law reflecting social reality: ‘Le 
pluralisme juridique est le corollaire du pluralisme social’ (‘Legal pluralism is the consequence of social 
pluralism’) as Reyntjens says. Filip Reyntjens, ‘Note sur l’utilité d’introduire un systéme juridique «pluraliste» 
dans la macro-comparaison des droits’ (1991) 41 Revue internationale de droit comparé 41, 43 
79 See Volkmar Gessner, Armin Hoeland and Csaba Varga, ‘Foreword’ in V Gessner and others (eds), 
European Legal Cultures (Dartmouth 1996) 
80 In the words of Grossfeld: ‘law is an expression of cultural experience, of an understanding exceeding that of 
single generation’ Grossfeld (n 45) 44 
 
 
distinguish levels of comparative study of law. These are the level of legal-theoretical and 
legal-dogmatic comparisons, legal comparisons, comparative implementation research and 
comparisons of legal systems.81 The latter level contains all the previous levels, but also 
includes the behavior of those outsiders involved with the law i.e. ‘legal addressees’. It is of 
importance to note that this methodologically driven manner of defining legal culture is not 
purely sociological because it encompasses the other levels too. In other words, legal norms 
and legal doctrines, judicial practices and scholarship, application of law and – finally – a 
larger sociological or even social-psychological component are also taken into account. The 
methodological spectrum seems to contain the most relevant layers of comparative law’s own 
history; from official texts (sources of law) to empirical contexts. This sort of comparative 
inquiry does not stay inside the boundaries of formal law or within the methodology available 
for studying only instruments of positive law and ending up with legal families. Understood 
in this manner, law is conceived by the comparative legal culture(s) approach as a culturally-
situated phenomenon that exists ‘within a culture-specific discourse’.82 Notwithstanding this, 
the notion of legal culture is first and foremost a socio-legal concept and not a historical-
doctrinal construct like legal family. As an example, we next discuss the Dutch legal culture 
in order to illustrate how legal culture differs from the macro-construct of legal family and 






4.2.1. Illustration of Culture: Dutch Soft Approach 
 
Until 1648 the Netherlands was a part of the Holy Roman Empire, which largely explains 
why Dutch law has so many basic similarities with German law.83 Therefore, it comes as no 
surprise that Dutch law belongs to the civil law legal family; it exists somewhere between 
French and German law, yet it has its own distinctive legal cultural features that separate it 
from both the French and German legal systems. According to Smits, ‘There is no doubt that 
the Dutch legal system can be qualified as a civil law system as it has codified major parts of 
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83 Blankenburg (n 54) 2 
 
 
private law and criminal law in codes and meets all other requirements usually attributed to 
the civil law legal system’. According to this macro-view, Dutch law is situated in between 
French and German law although it is, in a formal sense, closer to German law. The Dutch 
Civil Code from 1992, in particular, makes it visibly clear that official Dutch law is close to 
German law.84 Consequently, the Dutch legal system is at home in the civil law legal family. 
However, there are many features that set Dutch legal culture apart from German law. 
Accordingly, the notion of family seems to be simply insufficient. Often the literature 
mentions liberal attitudes towards certain emblematic features, which are attitudes towards 
euthanasia, prostitution, and the use of soft drugs.85  
 
Nevertheless, there are remarkable similarities between German and Dutch law if and when 
the focus is on the letter of the law and the history of formal legal institutions, as is the case 
with the legal family conceptualization. But although these systems are close to each other on 
paper, the Dutch legal vision embraces the principle of discretion rather than the principle of 
legality, i.e. the Dutch notion of redelijkheid en billijkheid (broadly ‘reasonability’) is by and 
large resorted to. Importantly, this legal cultural feature leads to a non-legalistic and 
pragmatic legal culture which is different from the German legal culture.86 In other words, 
even if Germany and the Netherlands belong to the same legal family (civil law and 
especially its sub-group German law), they still have different legal cultures. In other words, 
the legal family approach is not sufficient in order to tell these legal systems apart. 
 
According to the analysis of Blankenburg, there are certain key differences between German 
and Dutch legal culture even though they do belong to the same legal family. This analysis 
also illustrates how the macro-constructs of legal family and legal culture are not the same 
thing. Now, Blankenburg distinguishes differing legal cultural patterns of legal behavior by 
focusing on things like the legal profession, access to justice, courts and litigation, civil 
litigation and criminal courts.87 One of the key differences between Dutch and German legal 
cultures is the fact that there are many more lawyers in Germany. The size of the legal 
profession reflects the fact that they are not functionally equivalent professions because in 
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85 See Smits (n 84) 623. See also Wibo Van Rossum, ‘Dutch Legal Culture’ in Jeroen Chorus, Ewoud Hondius 
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Germany there is a statutory monopoly, whereas in the Netherlands lawyers as a profession 
face competition from other professions.88 In fact, the Dutch legal culture has certain general 
similarities, such as flexibility and the avoidance of legalism, with the Nordic legal culture.89 
 
But what actually separates the two members of the very same legal family? Generally 
speaking, there is a certain Dutch reluctance to go to court straight away. When it comes to 
access to justice, the Dutch litigants and attorneys are cautious about alternatives to going to 
court and costs of the judicial process.90 Moreover, the fact that the Dutch do not spend so 
much money on the judiciary, but focus rather on things like legal aid and the social outfit of 
prisons, tells us something about the differences concerning litigation behavior and attitudes 
towards courts in general.91 The differences in litigation in Germany and the Netherlands are 
simply that the Germans produce a clearly higher level of civil litigation, whereas Dutch 
figures are considerably lower.92 One explanation for these figures is that in Germany there 
have been fewer alternatives to avoiding courts.93 Differences in punitivity have also been 
significant, and they can be explained by the differing professional mentalities in the two 
countries: the German ‘strict penal positivism’ differs from the Dutch ‘more circumstantial 
medical-social work’ approach.94 
 
In essence, the Dutch legal culture is something we can characterize as tolerant or reasonably 
flexible: people are accustomed to a state of affairs where there is a largely accepted 
tolerance concerning the following of legal rules.95 However, these Dutch features are no 
coincidence. Rather, they are a part of the Dutch societal atmosphere, which can be seen also 
in other walks of life. For instance, Dutch politics is based largely on negotiation and 
compromise because in the multi-party system, no single political party can achieve an 
absolute majority in the Parliament.96 The Dutch constitutional culture has been described as 
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a ‘rather sober or moderate’ with the role of legal Constitution being rather small in the 
Dutch democracy.97 Again, this is reminiscent of the Nordic constitutional culture which 
differs clearly from the continental European models.98 
 
One of the overall explanations for the Dutch legal culture is, in fact, not legal at all in its 
nature. Of practical historical importance is the so-called poldermodel, which refers to the 
Dutch fight against sea water in a country that is largely situated below sea level.99 This 
explains more about the Dutch legal mentality than being a member in a certain legal family 
in a doctrinal and narrowly legal historical sense would. This model has created a high-trust 
society where the law is no substitute for social trust; instead, the law in practice may 
function in a non-legalistic and consensual manner. For an outside comparative legal 
researcher, the fact that the battle against water has shaped the Dutch legal culture so strongly 
may come as a surprise. Nonetheless, it is a crucial factor to take into account if one tries to 
understand Dutch law-in-action and to explain why a seemingly (rules, institutions, doctrines, 
cases and so on) German-style legal system functions with a softer approach, circumventing 
legal positivism and legalism on the basis of high-trust society features.  
 
In this cultural view, the fact that Dutch law is a member of the civil law legal family and a 
member of its German sub-division plays no decisive role. In his book about the history of 
Amsterdam, Mak makes it clear how the ‘defence of the land against their greatest enemy: 
water’ has been important for the Dutch societal, political and legal culture.100 In a 
methodological sense the legal culture approach fulfils much of its methodological promise 
by going beyond the positive law and doctrinal genealogy; it is more than what the doctrinal-
historical notion of legal family can provide as it allows us to distinguish between Dutch and 
German law from the point view of macro-comparative law. Then again, we also have to take 
into account the fact that Dutch pragmatism and social trust is, of course, influenced by other 
factors too. One important historical reason is that Netherlands has been an open trading 
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nation for more than five centuries and too rigid a legal system would have been 
economically impractical. Accordingly, law has been molded to follow political economy.101 
To conclude, the historical paths of Nordic and Dutch legal systems are different; however, 
the Dutch system is clearly a part of the continental European civil law family, but its legal 
culture resembles that of the Nordic region. 
 
 
4.3. Tradition – Underlining the Living Roots of Law 
 
If we follow Glenn’s theory we can see that his legal traditions differ from families or 
cultures. In fact, there are traditions that exist within larger traditions. Glenn mentioned such 
lateral traditions as casuistry (Roman, Talmudic, Islamic, common law and even perhaps 
Hindu law).102 He also mentioned analogical reasoning (Islamic and common law), 
fundamentalism and the tradition of the professional jurist. However, the most important 
lateral traditions are the forms of mega-traditions. One example is the tradition of 
universalism, which may take an aggressive or a more subtle form; regardless, it relies on 
universalistic ideas that it holds to be true for all (peace, God, rights, metaphysics and the 
like).103 The tradition of tolerance is very close to Glenn’s main argument, because if ‘major 
legal traditions are to co-exist in the world, without […] violence, imperialism and 
suppression, it therefore seems necessary to examine somewhat more closely the teaching of 
different traditions with respect to universalism and […] tolerance.’104 This kind of view of 
law differs not only from the doctrinal-historical approach, but also from the socio-legal 
cultural approach, and draws inspiration from epistemically focused legal anthropology. 
 
If we look deeper into the theory of legal traditions we can see that most such traditions are 
universally normative. Talmudic and Islamic laws are clearly normative, extending their 
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norms to regulate most aspects of human life. Hindu law seems to allow plenty of room for 
choice, but if one is Hindu there is no escape from certain norms and rules (see chapter 
4.3.3.). Similarly, the Asian tradition (broadly understood) seems to allow free space but, 
while it rejects much of the formal law, it contains other sorts of social norms regulating 
behavior. One might be inclined to think that Western law would be the least traditional and 
the most concerned with granting freedom and rights, but this is a superficial image. The 
hidden normativity of the Western traditions is that one is obliged to be free and to exercise 
one’s rights.105 Normativity causes a problem where one would like to develop a theory of 
reconciling legal traditions: how can reconciliation take place where traditions are normative 
and require universalism without lapsing into sheer relativism? If we follow Glenn, the 
answer lies within the complexity of most legal traditions.  
 
Major legal traditions are complex; they contain overlapping internal and lateral traditions 
that are inconsistent with each other and perhaps not even consistent with the ruling version 
within their major tradition. This is possible because they have the ability to hold together 
sub-traditions that are mutually inconsistent. Even so, the traditions entertain a particular way 
of thinking, as do legal families and legal cultures. This notwithstanding, the major legal 
traditions are steeped in multivalent thinking even though Western legal self-understanding in 
particular maintains that Western law is built on bivalent thinking. But what is meant by 
bivalent and multivalent (legal) thinking? 
 
In short, one may say that bivalent logic insists under all circumstances that one is faced with 
‘A’ or ‘Not A’. To simplify crudely: either you have civil law or Islamic law; either you have 
Talmudic law or common law; either you belong to this legal family or to that legal family; 
either you belong to the Western legal culture or you belong to the Eastern legal culture, and 
so on. According to bivalent logic, there are no other possibilities: either you eat the cake or 
you do not eat the cake. To say that something was ‘A and Not A’ would constitute logical 
inconsistency. Applied to macro-comparative law, this would mean that a system is normally 
conceived of as a civil law system or common law system but not both. But as we already 
saw above, this is not the case; the realities of actual living legal systems are far more 
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nuanced than that. Importantly, everything is – according to multivalent thinking – a matter 
of degree.106  
 
Essentially, all major legal traditions are multivalent because they are constructions of a 
middle-ground allowing constant reconciliation of the inconsistent extreme poles of the 
tradition. They are also able to overcome the argument of incommensurability so that they 
hold the legal tradition together. And yet traditions are normative, and complex legal 
traditions are ‘irresistibly normative’. Nonetheless, major traditions do not have any 
universalizable core, and in fact they offer grounds for (internal) accommodations with other 
complex major legal traditions. Moreover, there is interdependency between traditions, unlike 
between legal families or legal cultures.107 Hindu law is a good example of this kind of legal 
tradition, which we will look at it more closely in the following section. 
 
 
4.3.3. Illustration of Tradition: Hindu Law’s Presence of the Past 
 
There is a certain parallelism between Hinduism and Buddhism and, as noted by Berman, 
both of these religious belief systems share ‘dharma which might be translated as “law” but 
which should, however, be conceived of more as a kind of sacred law rather than positive 
State-law’.108 In any case, we can assume that dharma (as the duty to do the right thing) is a 
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key concept in Hindu law.109 This kind of law deals crucially with the spiritual precepts 
through which people may attain enlightenment and nirvana, which refers to the ultimate 
rebirth.110 Undoubtedly, Hindu law is quite a slippery notion because it is both a legal system 
and a religious tradition. Notwithstanding this, it is a good example of a legal tradition that 
contains both legal and religious elements simultaneously. 
 
The Hindu legal tradition of today is still rooted in the past and emanates from the Vedas, the 
Upanishads, and other religious texts. It has been transformed by later practitioners from 
various Hindu philosophical schools, and even later by Jains and Buddhists.111 An important 
ancient document is Manu Smriti or ‘The Laws of Manu’, which is an ancient text that 
formed the source for Hindu law and social customs for thousands of years.112 Although The 
Laws of Manu are sacred in their nature, they differ from many other types of religious laws. 
Importantly, Hindu legal tradition does not have a sacred code of laws which would be 
dictated verbatim by God, as is the case in Islamic or Jewish legal traditions.113 In fact, the 
codes of Hindu law are based upon the time, place and contemporary circumstances of the 
people and communities to whom they apply.114 Crucially, Hindu law is neither a legal 
family nor does it seem to be a legal culture with definable geographical borders. 
 
As a macro-construct, legal tradition closely resembles an anthropological way to view law. 
Legal anthropology tells us, among other things, that ‘people in local communities often do 
not distinguish clearly whether and to what extent their norms and practices are based on 
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local tradition, tribal custom, or religion’.115 In addition, Hindu law shows that it is not only 
national Indian law, but is also applied widely abroad where it may be recognized as a form 
of personal law, as in some states in Africa (e.g. Kenya).116 Yet, it would not be quite right to 
describe these legal systems as belonging to the Hindu legal family or Hindu legal culture in 
the sense of macro-comparative law. Moreover, Hindu law can also be found in the West, 
where Hindu people still follow their traditional law albeit in the form of unofficial law, 
which is invisible to a narrow gaze centered on doctrinal or official law.  
 
As a legal tradition Hindu law is old, but it too has changed. A significant change in the 
historical development of Hindu law occurred in the sixteenth century when India fell under 
Islamic rule, and thus the jurisdiction and administration fell under the influence of Islamic 
law. Later, the formal position of Hindu law improved in the British period of the nineteenth 
century, when it was given official status.117 The British period also meant restrictions in the 
sphere of Hindu law, because its application was limited to certain fields of law while at the 
same time the British general law in regard to India was correspondingly expanded.118 The 
underlying and unavoidable problem was legal cultural because, as Shah explains, ‘[t]he 
British were reading Indian society according to their own understanding of state-religion 
relations’.119 As a practical result stemming from the Anglo-Hindu law, the classical Hindu 
law and jurisprudence started to weaken and petrify.120 The attempts of British judges and 
administrators to follow Hindu law in their decisions were, due to an insufficient knowledge 
base that was often distorted, unfortunate for the development of Hindu law. As a result, a 
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combination of law, not quite Hindu or British, emerged.121 In general, courts were expected 
to apply the common law in their decisions, but the possibility remained that Islamic or 
Hindu law would be applied if the case involved family law or law of inheritance. The basic 
situation is still the same, even though India, of course, is an independent state.122 However, 
by and large the new official law of the independent India changed, and Hindu law went 
underground and turned mostly into an unofficial law. In contrast, the official law belongs 
mostly to the common law legal family, although, due to the federal nature of Indian law, its 
legal culture differs from English common law.123 Yet, Hindu law did not cease to be a legal 
tradition with its own claim of normativity concerning religious Hindus. This is true also with 
indigenous groups and their internal legal traditions in India; however, the analysis here 
concerns Hindu law as a more extensive legal tradition, not simply as a part of the Indian 
legal system.124 
 
Modern Hindu law is a similar type of personal legal system along with equivalent systems 
for Muslims and Sikhs. Hence, even though there is change and mutation, there is also 
continuation and evolution of the Hindu legal tradition. As Menski points out: ‘there will 
always remain an element of dharmic foundation in the legal system applying to, and being 
applied by, Hindu people’.125 The Westernization of Indian law and Hindu law may only be a 
superficial phenomenon.126 In this sense, Hindu law is a legal tradition in the sense meant by 
Glenn. If we choose to look at Glenn’s epistemology from the point of view of academic 
disciplines, we can sense that he is not to be placed in the ranks of sociology, theoretical 
jurisprudence, economics, history or linguistics; instead he combined historically sensitive 
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comparative law with heavy doses of epistemic anthropology and theory of knowledge, with 
small pinches of relativist ingredients.127 Consequently, Glenn’s notion of ‘legal tradition’ is 
theoretically more subtle than the notions of legal family and legal culture. However, it is 
undoubtedly closer to legal culture than legal family. For lack of a better word, the legal 
traditions approach may be described as epistemic macro-legal anthropology, and as such it 






Although this article makes only a tentative start on the process of reloading macro-
comparative law’s theoretical program, one key observation concerning the macro-constructs 
seems almost inevitable: Families, cultures and traditions overlap with each other.128 What is 
more, no clear winner emerges. From there it follows that we may use all of these 
conceptualizations in the same text without the risk of the text becoming hopelessly 
incoherent or incomprehensible.129 But, as we saw above, the three macro-constructs are not 
similar, and they work poorly together because they are conceived as mutually exclusive. By 
the same token, if and when we apply multivalent logic, things look different and 
exclusiveness is shown to stand on shaky ground. Although not all would agree with this 
perspective, this article has shown that despite differences all the key-macro constructions are 
close to each other and, indeed, there are no unbridgeable chasms between them if we 
abandon narrow technical understandings of them. However, this article did not develop an 
explanatory or predictive theory concerning the simultaneous usage of macro-notions. Yet, it 
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was shown above that these conceptualizations are not mutually exclusive – that is the key 
basis of the reloading metaphor. 
 
The legal family approach is typical for a doctrinally oriented (Western) comparative study of 
law that focuses on legislation and case law. The legal cultural approach takes positive law 
and doctrine into account, but does not blindly rely on legislation and case law (i.e. official 
law); rather, it seeks to take into account interrelationships between official law and un-
official law, which has to do with the actual behavior of legal actors within a legal culture.130 
In other words, legal families approaches focus on ‘law in books’ whereas legal cultural 
approaches look more at the ‘law in action’. As Wibo Van Rossum explains, the legal cultural 
approach ‘requires more than a historical analysis of what qualifies as “law” or part of “the 
legal system” in a legal positivistic sense’.131 The difference between family and tradition, 
and culture and tradition, is related to the different epistemic nature of these macro-
constructs: family and culture both emphasise and start from the assumption according to 
which legal things – or generally speaking, societal things – related to law are different 
among other peoples.132 Tradition, on the contrary, is not built so clearly on the epistemology 
of difference.133 As is the case with Hindu law, legal tradition is able to survive and exist in 
many kinds of legal families and legal cultures: traditions may survive in the porous sub-
systems of legal families and legal cultures. As a result, we can see that each macro-construct 
has an interactive bond with the disciplinary view of a legal system (in a very broad sense), 
which is generalized accordingly under the heading of family, culture or tradition.  
 
But where does the proposed reloading lead us? Basically, it seems to offer more 
possibilities. It is possible to say that a legal system belongs to a certain legal family that is 
different from the legal culture it belongs to? For instance, if and when we look from the 
epistemological point of view of an outsider, we may argue that Hong Kong’s law belongs to 
the family of common law, but its legal culture on the whole bears clear Asian legal cultural 
characteristics, and Chinese law characteristics in particular. As another example, for 
instance, we can claim that the Dutch legal system belongs to the civil law legal family (sub-
group of Germanic law), but in a larger view the Dutch legal culture resembles quite clearly 
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the Nordic legal culture in its softness and flexibility. Hindu law, in turn, seems to be able to 
survive and function under many kinds of legal families and legal cultures ranging from 
Indian common law to Kenyan African legal culture. And, we can expand this conclusion 
beyond the confines of this paper: Scotland’s legal culture is of a common law type, although 
in the sense of legal families it does not belong to the common law legal family.134 Or, for 
example, we may say that Turkish law belongs technically to the civil law legal family, 
whereas its legal culture has clear features of the Islamic legal tradition.135 Here we can see 
another kind of problem concerning the role of religion in that it used primarily to describe 
non-Western systems, whereas Western systems are painted as based on reason and 
secularism. This kind of usage of religion quite likely reinforces the idea according to which 
the West is fundamentally different. The relationship between religion and macro-constructs 
is clearly an area for further critical scholarship on macro-comparative law, but that is beyond 
the scope of this paper  
 
Finally, if macro-comparative law’s conceptual framework is reloaded it makes it possible to 
use the old notions of family, culture and tradition simultaneously. This means that there is 
no simple black-or-white logic implying that there are only two options that would work for 
macro-comparative law. According to bivalent logic, the only possibilities are either legal 
system A or B, because to say that something is A and Not A would constitute logical 
inconsistency. Paradoxically, this is precisely what works in the world of macro-comparative 
law if and when its theoretical program is reloaded in the manner proposed in this article. 
Some groups of systems may rightly be called legal family, whereas others might be 
described more aptly as legal culture or legal tradition. As we saw above, these notions are 
not mutually exclusive, hence, we may speak of reloading i.e. theoretically rebooting the 
heuristic conceptualizations without having to abandon them. 
 
The only thing that really needs to be deleted is the taxonomical objective of twentieth 
century comparative law – particularly the civil law trait – which means embracing the 
paradoxicality of the world’s law, whether it is in the form of families, cultures, traditions or 
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some other overarching generalization.136 On the whole, if we are ready to conceive the 
global legal world as plural and divergent, then, it would not make sense to deploy one-eyed 
epistemology and the accompanying exclusiveness of a one-size-fits-all macro-construct.  
                                               
136 cf Glenn (n 18) 173-74 
